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STATE AND LOCAL ADVISORY REPORTS ON 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR LEGISLATION: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Russell A. Smith* 
RECENT years have witnessed a tendency on the part of state and local governmental authorities, executive and legislative, to 
establish advisory groups to make recommendations concerning 
public employment labor relations legislation.1 In addition, the 
National Governors' Conference in 1966 created a "Task Force on 
State and Local Government Labor Relations" which, with the 
support of a grant from the Carnegie Foundation, made a study of 
labor relations policy in the public sector. In 1967, this group made 
its report, which contained a significant set of "findings" by an ad 
hoc Advisory Committee.2 These reports are tangible evidence of an 
increasing realization by public officials and the general populace 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1929, Grinnell College; J .D. 1934, 
University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. President Kennedy established a precedent for the advisory-group approach at 
the state level by his appointment in 1961 of a "President's Task Force on Employee-
Management Relations in the Federal Service." This group was headed by then 
Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. The Report, sometimes referred to as the "Gold-
berg Task Force Report," was implemented in 1962 by Executive Order 10,988 [3 C.F.R. 
521 (1959-1963 compilation)] which, for the first time, established as a general policy 
at the federal level, rights of unionization and collective bargaining for employees of 
most federal agencies. The executive order provided for several varieties of "recogni-
tion," including exclusive representation in appropriate units under certain circum-
stances. It required federal agencies to engage in collective bargaining with organiza-
tions having exclusive bargaining rights, and to grant other forms of "recognition" to 
organizations not having such rights. The executive order denied a right of recogni-
tion to any organization asserting the right of federal employees to strike, and it 
excluded certain managerial areas from the scope of collective bargaining. The order 
left bargaining unit determination within the control of the employing agency. 
Specific sanctions for violation of the obligations imposed on the agencies were not 
stipulated, nor was any tribunal given authority to enforce such obligations. The Civil 
Service Commission, however, was charged with the development of "a program to 
assist in carrying out the objectives" of the order. In so doing, it has issued in the 
form of guidelines, "Standards of Conduct for Employees Organizations and Code of 
Fair Labor Practices." 
2. Report of the Task Force on State and Local Government Labor Relations. 
(This Report was published by the Public Personnel Association, which has granted 
permission for quotations that appear in this Article.) Governor Smith, of West 
Virginia, noted in his Letter of Transmittal to the National Governors' Conference 
that the Task Force study had a fourfold mission: 
I. To provide information essential to the formulation of a sound philosophy on 
many facets of government-employee relations. 
2. To furnish a frame of reference for the consideration of legislative and admin-
instrative measures. 
3. To identify critical issues and policies, alternative ways of handling them, and to 
assess their impact on the public service. 
4. To draw on the relevant private sector experience in a public sector setting. 
There bas since been issued a 1968 supplement to the Task Force Report (also pub-
lished by the Public Personnel Association). 
[ 891] 
892 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:891 
that public employee "unionism," with its attendant problems, has 
emerged as the most significant development in American labor rela• 
tions in the last decade. 
The reasons for public concern are obvious. First, there has been 
a rapid increase in the proportion of the total work force employed 
by various levels of government.3 Unionism in the private sector has 
apparently reached a plateau both in terms of the level of manage• 
ment-employee involvement and in conceptualization of underlying 
dispute settlement philosophies, procedures, and legal structures. In 
marked contrast, the public sector has become the focus of increas-
ingly successful organizational efforts by unions and certain profes-
sional associations seeking collective bargaining rights on behalf of 
public employees-teachers, policemen, fire fighters, sanitation work-
ers, transit workers, and others. At the same time, public policy-
with certain notable exceptions emerging only in recent years-has 
been essentially adverse to attempts at unionization and collective 
bargaining in the public sphere.4 
A large number of states and some municipalities have repudiated 
past policies adverse to self-organization in the public sector by 
enacting legislation granting rights of unionization and collective 
bargaining to public employees,5 but the traditional prohibition 
against strikes by public employees remains unchanged. Yet, as any-
one who reads the newspapers knows, public employees have been 
increasingly prepared to resort to strikes in open defiance of the law. 
This is true even in the case of policemen and firefighters-em-
ployees whose services are regarded as essential to the community. 
Thus, the grant of organizational and bargaining rights to public 
3. Stieber, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in THE AMERICAN AssEMBLY, 
CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 65 (1965). 
4. See generally Smith &: Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping 
Labor Relations Law, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 411, 421-25; Stieber, supra note 3. 
5. CALIF. GoVT. CODE §§ 3500-11 (West Supp. 1968) (excluding school district em• 
ployees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -478 (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153b to d (Supp. 1969), § I0-153f (1967) (teachers and 
school superintendants); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN. 
LAws ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1967) (municipal employees); MASs. ANN. LAws. ch. 149, 
§ 178F (Supp. 1968) (state employees); MxcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1967) 
("Hutchinson Act'); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.50-.58 (1966); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 105.500-
.530 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Cxv. SERv. LAw, §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968) ("Taylor 
Law') [The present version of this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 
(effective April 1, 1969), appears in Government Employee Relations Report, No. 288, 
at F-1 (March 17, 1969).]; ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780 (1967); R. I. GEN. LAws 
§§ 28-9.1 to -14 (1969) (Fire Fighters); R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-9.2-1 to -14 (1969) (police-
men); R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (1969) (teachers); R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-9.4-1 
to -19 (1969) (municipal employees); R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 36-11-1 to -6 (Supp. 1967) 
(state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05 (Supp. 1968) (municipal employees); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111-70(1) to (5) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); WIS. STAT, ANN. 
§§ 111.80-.94 (Supp. 1969) (state employees); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. tit. 41.56 (Supp. 
1967). 
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employees has left unresolved many important legal and social issues, 
including-some would argue6-the very premises underlying the 
modem legislation. Also unresolved are problems of accommodating 
public employee collective bargaining (with or without a legal right 
to strike) with serious public concern over the subject areas and 
impact of that bargaining. 
In this context, the reports of the various advisory groups may 
appropriately be regarded as an important body of opinion con-
cerning public sector unionization. This, I assume, is why the editors 
of the Michigan Law Review concluded that a discussion of them 
should be included in this Symposium. Instead of focusing on two 
or three of the more recent and highly publicized reports, I will 
discuss most of them, recognizing that space limitations necessarily 
preclude a comprehensive treatment of each. 
The reports surveyed in this Article will be designated by refer-
ence to the state or other governmental unit with which each is asso-
ciated. The reports are, in chronological order, the Connecticut 
Report of February 1965,7 the Minnesota Report of March 1965,8 the 
Rhode Island Report of February 1966,9 the New York ("Taylor 
Committee") Report of March 1966,10 the Michigan Report of 
6. See generally Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH, L. REv. 93 (1969). 
7. Report of the Interim Commission To Study Collective Bargaining by Municipali-
ties. This report was issued by an eleven-member commission established by Public 
Act No. 495 of the 1963 Connecticut General Assembly. The Commission, composed of 
municipal officials, employer organization officials, state legislators, and academicians, 
was chaired by Professor Robert Stutz of the University of Connecticut. 
8. Report of the Governor's Committee on Public Employee Labor Relations Laws. 
The Committee was appointed by Governor Carl F. Rolvaag and consisted of repre-
sentatives of labor, public employer management, and the academic community. Its 
chairman was Judge William D. Gunn of the Minnesota District Court. 
9. This was a report of a Commission To Study Mediation and Arbitration created 
by the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Commission consisted of four members 
from the house of representatives, three from the senate, and four from the "public,'' 
appointed by the Governor. The Report resulted in the enactment of the Rhode 
Island Teachers Arbitration Act. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-1 (1968). 
10. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, Final 
Report, March 31, 1966. Excerpts of the report are reproduced in GOVERNMENT EM-
PLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT [hereinafter GERR] No. 135, at D-1 to D-2 (April II, 1966). 
The Governor's Committee also submitted two subsequent reports, a first Interim Re-
port on June 17, 1968, and a second Interim Report on Jan. 23, 1969. The "Governor's 
Committee on Public Employee Relations" was appointed by Governor Nelson Rocke-
feller. The members of the Committee were George W. Taylor, Chairman, E. Wight 
Bakke, David L. Cole, John T. Dunlop, and Frederick H. Harbison-all well-known 
labor relations experts. 
Mention should also be made of the Report of the New York City Tripartite Panel 
To Improve Collective Bargaining Procedures (1966). This Panel was appointed by 
Mayor 'Wagner, and its report formed the basis for the establishment, by charter, of the 
Office of Collective Bargaining. This agency has jurisdiction to decide representation 
questions, provide mediation services, appoint collective bargaining "impasse panels,'' 
and provide for grievance arbitration. The report also served as the basis for the 
enactment of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (Administrative Code, 
ch. 54, Local Law 53-1967), and the issuance in September 1967 of Executive Order 
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February 1967,11 the Illinois Report of March 1967,12 the New Jersey 
Report of January 1968,13 the Pennsylvania Report of June 1968,14 
and the Los Angeles County Report of July 1968.15 The "findings" 
made by the National Governors' Conference Task Force Report 
will not be included in this survey, but this omission carries no 
invidious connotation. The Task Force Report is required reading 
for anyone interested in public employment relations because it 
contains, in addition to a general bibliography, an excellent analysis 
of the problems presented by publJc sector unionism and much 
valuable factual documentation of existing laws. 
I. PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE REPORTS: AN OVER-ALL APPRAISAL 
The task assigned to most of the advisory groups by their respec-
tive governmental units was very broad: What kind of a statutory 
policy on public employee unionism should the particular jurisdic-
tion adopt? There was no legislation granting rights of unionization 
to public employees in Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, Illinois, 
or Los Angeles County prior to the appointment of the advisory 
committees. In New York, the legislation in effect at the time of the 
report-the Condon-Wadlin Law16-simply prohibited strike action 
under threat of repressive penalties. Thus, Condon-Wadlin not only 
provided for automatic dismissal of any striking employee, but also 
specified that should he subsequently be rehired, he would be in-
eligible for higher pay until three years after the strike. Moreover, he 
No. 52. Under these provisions, rights of unionization and collective bargaining are 
conferred on employees of City agencies other than the Board of Education. 
11. A Governor's Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations was appointed 
by Governor George Romney in July 1966. The members of the Committee were the 
author (as chairman), Gabriel N. Alexander, Edward L. Cushman, Ronald W. Haugh• 
ton, and Charles C. Killingsworth. 
12. The Governor's Advisory Commission on Labor-Management Policy for Public 
Employees was appointed by Governor Otto Kerner, and included representatives from 
labor, management, the state legislature, and universities. Professors Martin 'Wagner 
and Milton Derber of the University of Illinois served as Chairman and Vice Chairman, 
respectively. 
13. The New Jersey Public and School Employees' Grievance Procedures Study 
Commission was established pursuant to a mandate of the New Jersey legislature. The 
Commission consisted of twelve members, two from the senate, two from the assembly, 
and eight appointed by the Governor. The Chairman was Marver H. Bernstein. 
14. The Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsyl-
vania was appointed by Governor Raymond P. Shafer. The Commission consisted of 
Chairman Leon E. Hickman, eight "citizen members," and two members of the 
legislature. 
15. A Consultants' Committee was appointed by the Board of Supervisors of Los 
Angeles County to recommend an employee relations ordinance for Los Angeles 
County. The Committee consisted of Benjamin Aaron, Chairman, Lloyd H. Bailer, and 
Howard Block. 
16. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of 
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963) N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). 
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was to remain on "probation" for five years. Since none of the exis-
ting laws had proved effective in preventing strikes, the problem in 
each jurisdiction was to start afresh and frame a new kind of policy. 
By the time the Michigan Advisory Committee was created, 
Michigan had already adopted its 1965 Public Employment Rela-
tions Act,17 which granted rights of unionization to public employees 
and reversed an earlier negative policy similar to that of New Yark. 
The Michigan Committee, established in the context of an antici-
pated school strike emergency in the fall of 1965, was requested to 
reassess the basic policies reflected in the 1965 Act and to determine 
whether there were any serious deficiencies in that law which should 
be corrected immediately.18 The recommendations of the Michigan 
group have yet to receive legislative approval, although there has 
been strong support for some of the proposals. 
The New York Report contains the best in-depth analysis of the 
unique characteristics of state and local public employment relations 
bearing upon the question whether and within what limits public 
policy should accord rights of unionization and collective bargaining 
to public employees. The Illinois Report (influenced, I suspect, con-
siderably by the work of the Taylor Committee) also deserves special 
commendation for its treatment of the relevant policy issues. This 
report was the more remarkable because, despite the tripartite com-
position of the Governor's Advisory Commission, it achieved sub-
stantial unanimity in its conclusions. Although the recommenda-
tions of the Illinois Commission reached the state legislature, they 
foundered there in part because of disagreement within the ranks 
of labor.19 
The Connecticut, Illinois, and Los Angeles reports contain the 
most complete treatment of the details of proposed legislation. 
Indeed, the Connecticut and Los Angeles reports respectively in-
corporated a draft statute and ordinance which in all essentials 
17. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201-.216 (1967). For a discussion of the 1965 Act, 
see Howlett, Michigan's New Public Employment Relations Act, 45 MICH. ST. B.J. 12 
(1966); GERR No. 206, at E-1 (Aug. 21, 1967), which contains the text of the 
speech, "Michigan's Experience with Public Employee Bargaining,'' delivered by 
Robert G. Howlett, Chairman of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, to the An-
nual Convention of State Labor Relations Agencies. 
18. See GERR No. 181, at F-7 (Feb. 27, 1967). 
19. Most unions favored some form of legislation similar to that recommended by 
the Commission. However, they disagreed vehemently among themselves over the strike 
issue: some groups, including the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, were willing to accept a "no-strike" provision in order to obtain rights 
of self-organization and collective bargaining; other groups refused to accept any 
legislation which contained a ban on strikes. See Derber, Labor-Management Policy 
for Public Employees in Illinois: The Experience of the Governor's Commission, 21 
!Nous. &: LAB. REL. Rlw. 541, 552 (1968); GERR No. 199, at B-4 Guly 3, 1967); GERR 
No. 212, at B-13 (Oct. 2, 1967). 
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subsequently became law in those jurisdictions.20 Measured in terms 
of legislative response, these reports, together with the Minnesota, 
New Jersey, and Rhode Island reports, were the most successful. 
The New York Report also engendered an important legislative re-
sponse, although the Committee's basic recommendations, as modi-
fied, did not receive legislative approval until the second legislative 
session after the Report was issued.21 The Pennsylvania Report, on 
the other hand, seems doomed, at least for the present, to remain 
part of the archives. Governor Shafer has indicated his outright 
rejection of the Report's basic approach on the strike issue and has 
proposed his own set of alternatives.22 
II. ARE.As OF GENERAL CONSENSUS 
The advisory groups appear to be in general accord on certain 
matters of fact and on at least some basic principles which should be 
accepted as public policy. First, they agreed that there are certain 
salient differences between private and public employment relations 
which will necessarily affect the characteristics of collective bargain-
ing in the public sector. One result of this is that three decades of 
experience with governmental regulation of private labor relations 
may not be directly applicable to the settlement of disputes in the 
public sector. Second, panels agreed that, despite such differences, 
public policy should accord to public employees rights of self-organ-
ization and unionization similar to those accorded in the private 
sector-including some form of collective bargaining. Public em-
ployees should also enjoy the same freedom of choice which private 
sector employees have under the Taft-Hartley Act to refrain from 
unionization if they so desire.23 
The reports generally recommended that appropriate legislation 
be broad enough in scope to cover all or most categories of govern-
mental employees. Thus, under most proposals, the range of coverage 
would include blue-collar as well as white-collar workers, public 
school teachers, police and fire fighters, and, in some instances, even 
supervisory employees. The Michigan Committee, however, had to 
take into account an existing constitutional provision which prob-
ably has the effect of making those employees of the state government 
who are subject to the jurisdiction of the constitutionally created 
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. §§ 7-467 to 27-475 (1965); Los ANGELES COUNTY ORD. 
No. 9,646 (1968). 
21. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinzey Supp. 1968), amending ch. 790, art. 
VII, tit. C, § 108, [1958] N.Y. Laws, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751 (1948). 
22. See GERR No. 252 (July 8, 1968). See GERR No. 267, at E-1 (Oct. 21, 1968), for 
the alternative proposal by Governor Shafer. 
23. Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). 
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Civil Service Commission exempt from any labor relations legisla-
tion.2~ Although the Committee acknowledged this situation, it 
recommended that the Civil Service Commission, in its own discre-
tion, adopt the substance of official state policy on rights of public 
employee unionization and collective bargaining.25 
The advisory groups agreed that public sector labor legislation 
should include a prescribed set of public employer obligations 
toward employees and employee unions modeled after the code of 
employer unfair labor practices in the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).20 In addition, the panels usually proposed that a set of 
complementary obligations be imposed on labor organizations and 
employees. Here, however, the NLRA model was only partially fol-
lowed. Thus, the groups typically recommended that coercive mea-
sures to impose unionization upon employees or attempts to induce 
public employers to impose such constraints should be prohibited. 
Moreover, in the event an organization acquires bargaining rights, 
there should be a requirement of good faith collective bargaining 
with the employing agency. But, the advisory panels seem to have 
evidenced little concern with the other kinds of union "unfair labor 
practices" specified by the NLRA-secondary boycotts, organiza-
tional and recognitional picketing, and strikes in support of juris-
dictional disputes. The explanation for this is not clear. If we are to 
continue a "no-strike" policy in the public sector, it would seem that 
other kinds of concerted coercive action in support of collective bar-
gaining demands should also be prohibited. Organizational and 
recognitional picketing and strikes in support of jurisdictional dis-
putes could present the same kinds of problems in the public sector 
as they do in the private sector. 
It was generally agreed that public sector labor legislation should 
embrace the principle of exclusive recognition of the union or or-
ganization selected by the majority of employees in a defined bargain-
ing unit. Here again, the NLRA obviously had its influence on the 
advisory panels.27 The New York and Los Angeles reports, however, 
24. The Public Employment Relations Act purports to be a broad exercise of 
jurisdiction. With respect to state employees, it provides: "The provisions of this Act 
as to state employees within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission shall be 
deemed to apply insofar as the power exists in the Legislature to control employment 
by the state or the emoluments thereof." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.204a (1967). 
However, the Michigan Constitution provides: "The legislature may enact laws provid-
ing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the 
State classified Civil Service." MICH. CoNST. art. IV, § 48. 
25. GERR No. 181, at F·2, F-6 to F-7. 
26. NLRA § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964). 
27. The principle of "exclusive recognition" is incorporated in section 9 of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), along with criteria of a general nature followed by 
the National Labor Relations Board in defining an "appropriate bargaining unit." 
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indicated a somewhat different and more cautious approach than the 
NLRA in handling "representation" matters.28 
With the exception of the Pennsylvania Report, which would 
permit strikes in certain circumstances, all the reports agreed that 
legislation on public sector employment relations should continue 
the "no-strike" policy traditionally applicable to public employees.20 
As will be noted, however, the groups differed on the rigorousness of 
the sanctions which should be applied to vindicate this policy.30 
All the reports emphasized the necessity of devising effective 
dispute settlement procedures to take the place of strikes. Although 
it was generally recognized that the government has a responsibility 
to provide more than mediation services, the proposals for inter-
vention beyond mediation showed little originality. The formula 
usually suggested was "fact-finding" with accompanying public 
recommendations. Compulsory arbitration was rejected31 except in 
the Michigan32 and Rhode Island reports, in which it was recom-
mended on a limited basis only. None of the reports displayed the 
kind of ingenuity (some would say disingenuousness) to be found in 
the recently enacted Canadian national legislation,33 recommended by 
an advisory commission.34 
III. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE OR APPROACH 
A. Administration and Enforcement 
While there was general agreement that the resolution of repre-
sentation issues and the enforcement of the unfair labor practice pro-
28. The New York recommendation was merely for further study. N.Y. Report 29-
30. The Los Angeles recommendation was for recognition of only one organization, 
that which represents a majority. Such representation would not be exclusive. L.A. 
Report 23. 
29. See pt. 111.D.l. infra. 
30. See pt. 111.D.2. infra. 
31. See pt. 111.E. infra. 
32. GERR No. 181, at F-3. 
33. The Public Service Staff Relations Act was enacted in February 1967, c. 72, 
[1966-67] Can. Stat. This legislation, which applies only at the national level, grew 
in large part out of the work of a Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining 
in the Federal Civil Service established in 1963. The statute contains a number of very 
interesting features, the most significant of which from the American point of view, is 
the provision permitting a labor organization to "opt" either for a strike or for 
arbitration in connection with contract-term collective bargaining. The option has to 
be taken in advance of a collective bargaining period and can be revised annually. 
Certain subject matters are excluded from the arbitration process, and employees whose 
duties are deemed by the parties or the government to be "necessary in the interest 
of the safety or security of the public" are forbidden to engage in a strike. 
34. For a comparison of the Canadian Public Service Staff Relations Act to the United 
States Executive Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Compilation), see the report 
of the Canada-United States Conference on Labor Relations in GERR No. 273, at A-2 
(Dec. 2, 1968); see also Arthurs, Public Interest Disputes in Canada: A Legislative 
Perspective, 17 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 39 (1967); Arthurs, Collective Bargaining in the Pub-
lic Service of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?, 67 Mrca L. R.Ev. 971 (1969). 
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hibitions should be handled by an administrative agency, the reports 
differed on whether a single agency should administer both the 
private sector law and the public sector law. The Connecticut panel 
recommended that the same agency which administers the state's 
private sector labor legislation should also be given jurisdiction over 
public employment labor relations.35 In Michigan, the 1965 Act had 
already vested jurisdiction over public employment relations in the 
State Labor Mediation Board36-the same agency which administers 
the private sector legislation. The Michigan Committee, although 
listing the question of separate administration as a matter deserving 
further study, was not convinced that separation of administration 
was of such importance that it should be given immediate considera-
tion.37 
The Taylor Committee contemplated administration of the pro-
posed public sector legislation by a new agency-the Public Employ-
ment Relations Board-independent of the tribunal which adminis-
ters New York's private sector labor law;38 this recommendation was 
ultimately embodied in New York's so-called Taylor Law.39 The 
New York Report did not indicate the rationale behind its proposal 
for separate administration. The clear implication, however, is that 
since novel approaches may be required to deal with the unique 
problems of unionism in the public sector, the necessary expertise 
should be permitted to develop unhampered by any preconceptions 
associated with the administration of private sector legislation. Pre-
sumably, there is merit in this approach, although budgetary and 
other practical political constraints may dictate the solution in par-
ticular states. The New Jersey Commission's approach, for instance, 
had some unique aspects. Its position represented an amalgam drawn 
from the experience of other states and from practical considerations 
deemed appropriate to New Jersey. The Commission believed "that 
the experience of the private sector in dispute settlements should be 
applied to public employment when it is relevant and that functions 
of administration and enforcement that are pertinent only to public 
employment should be organized separately."40 It therefore recom-
mended the creation of a single govern.mental agency charged with 
the responsibility for invoking a variety of dispute settlement pro-
cedures short of compulsory arbitration in both the public and 
35. GERR No. 81, at D-4 (March 29, 1965). 
36. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967). 
37. GERR. No. 181, at F-12 (app.). 
38. N.Y. Report 22. 
39. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The present version of 
this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), appears 
in GERR, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).] 
40. GERR No. 229, at D-7 Gan. 29, 1968). 
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private sectors. It proposed a separate agency to deal with problems 
of representation and unfair practices in the public sector.41 
Another procedural problem is whether, following the model of 
the NLRA,42 the agency charged with administering the public 
sector legislation should have both prosecutorial and adjudicatory 
functions. The Connecticut Report suggests that the appropriate 
administrative agency should have both functions.48 However, in 
practice, the burden is on the complainant to prosecute his claim 
before the agency.44 The New York and Los Angeles Reports are 
unclear on this point, 45 and the implementing legislation in both 
jurisdictions is also somewhat ambiguous.46 In practice, the New 
York Public Employment Relations Board appears to follow closely 
the model of the NLRA: the Board's counsel can file charges and 
act as the prosecuting agent before the Board for both strike charges 
and claims of employer reprisals. In the case of Los Angeles, it was 
apparently contemplated that the ultimate decision should be left 
to the discretion of the Employee Relations Commission itself.47 The 
Commission has not yet adopted formal rules defining whether it will 
undertake a prosecutorial role in addition to its ad judicatory func-
tion, but it is clear that the Commission does have an important 
investigatory responsibility.48 The Illinois Report, on the other hand, 
stated categorically that the proposed Illinois Public Relations Board 
should have no investigatory or prosecutorial functions in unfair 
practice cases and that each complainant should be responsible for 
prosecuting his own claim.49 The rationale was that it would be 
unwise to combine in any single agency both the functions of "prose-
41. The resulting New Jersey statute did not fully implement these recommenda-
tions. See New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-l 
to -11 (Supp. 1968), amending N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-l to -13 (1959). 
42. Under the NLRA, all investigative and prosecutorial functions are lodged with 
the Office of the General Counsel, which exercises final authority on behalf of the 
NLRB in this area. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964). This approach could 
certainly be followed under state legislation on public employee unionism, provided 
public interest in the vindication of the statutory policies is sufficiently strong to 
justify the assumption of a public prosecutorial function. Such mundane considera-
tions as costs in relation to the total work load of the agency could be determinative 
of this question in some jurisdictions. Assuming the prosecutorial function is in-
vested in a public agency, a further question is whether the "prosecutor," upon filing 
a charge, should have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter from that point on. This 
question is not answered in any of the reports. 
43. GERR, No. 81, at D-1. 
44. Telephone interview with John A. Gaspic, agent of the state labor relations 
board in Hartford, Conn., Feb. 25, 1969. 
45. See N.Y. Report 36; L.A. Report 31-32. 
46. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 205(5) (McKinney Supp. 1968); L.A. COUNTY ORD. No. 
9,646, § 7(g) (1968). 
47. Telephone interview with Lloyd H. Bailer, Chairman of the Los Angeles Em-
ployee Relations Comm., Feb. 26, 1969. 
48. Id. 
49. GERR No. 184, at D-11 (March 20, 1967). 
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cutor and judge."50 The Michigan State Labor Mediation· Board, 
although apparently empowered under the 1965 Act to establish a 
prosecutorial arm, 51 has not yet done so. The Michigan Committee, 
however, did not regard this as a priority item. 
The reports typically assumed that the appropriate administra• 
tive tribunal would have discretion, supported upon review by the 
courts, to impose sanctions for substantive violations of the governing 
law on public employee unionism. Again, the procedures followed 
under the NLRA undoubtedly provided the model.52 The Los 
Angeles group's recommendations, however, were unique: an Em-
ployee Relations Commission would have jurisdiction over charges 
of unfair practices committed either by the County or by a labor 
organization. Upon a finding by this Commission of an unfair prac-
tice by an employee organization, "the County would be free to take 
such action as it deemed necessary under the circumstances," subject 
to authority in the Commission to review any action claimed to be 
"immoderately punitive."53 The Report was somewhat ambiguous, 
however, on the question whether a Commission order against the 
County Board of Supervisors would be legally enforceable. 
B. Representation Issues 
The reports recognize two basic kinds of representation issues. 
The first relates to the issue of exclusivity: Is an employee organiza-
tion to be recognized as the bargaining agent for union members 
alone, or for all employees in a defined "bargaining unit"? The 
second issue, which assumes acceptance of the principle of exclusive 
representation, concerns the establishment of suitable criteria for 
the definition of bargaining units. The Connecticut, Illinois, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania reports followed the model of 
the NLRA and subscribed to the principle of exclusive representa• 
tion. The exclusivity principle had already been adopted in the 
Michigan legislation of 1965,54 and the Michigan Committee did not 
advocate a change. 
The New York and Los Angeles reports were more cautious on 
the issue of exclusivity. Indeed, the Taylor Committee proposed 
that the newly established Public Employment Relations Board 
"should make the problem of exclusivity ... the focus of continuing 
study looking toward recommendations for legislation."55 In the 
50, Id. 
51. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967). 
52, See NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). 
53, L.A. Report 30. 
54. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.211 (1967). 
55. N.Y. Report 30. 
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meantime, the matter of exclusivity should be left "to agreement 
between the parties and to fact-finding boards."56 This recommenda-
tion was implemented in the 19~7 New York legislation57 which 
replaced the Condon-Wadlin Law. 
The Los Angeles Report included the following observations: 
... We believe that after some stability has been established in 
employee representation units and the parties have accumulated 
some experience in the conduct of collective relations under the 
ordinance, the issue of exclusive representation should be given 
careful reconsideration. Exclusive representation tends not only to 
enhance administrative efficiency, but also to increase the responsi-
bility as well as the power of the employees' exclusive representative. 
An organization having exclusive representation status speaks for 
all employees in the appropriate unit; but by the same token, it is 
legally bound fairly to represent each employee in that unit, whether 
or not he is a member of the organization. 
Under present circumstances, however, we do not think it feasible 
to provide for exclusive representation rights in the recommended 
ordinance .... To grant any organization exclusive representation 
at the opening stage of collective relations under the ordinance 
would tend to make subsequent unit determinations less flexible 
and might give that organization an unfair advantage over others.us 
However, the Report recommended that formal recognition be ac-
corded to the organization selected by a majority of the employees in 
an appropriate unit. "Status as majority representative would entitle 
the organization to negotiate with the management of that unit and 
to insist that any agreement reached be embodied in a written instru-
ment signed by both parties."59 This recommendation might appear 
to be somewhat inconsistent with the Commission's previous observa-
tions rejecting the notion of exclusive bargaining rights. Apparently, 
the answer is that while an organization could be certified to repre-
sent a majority of the employees in an "appropriate unit"-thereby 
giving it the right to negotiate an agreement applicable unit-wide-
any other organization representing employees within the unit would 
retain a right of "consultation." If this is a correct interpretation of 
the proposals, it seems that a "certified" employee organization 
would, as a practical matter, acquire exclusive bargaining rights. Any 
matter negotiated and incorporated into a written agreement be-
tween management and a certified union could hardly be subject to 
56. Id. 
57. The "Taylor Law," N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The 
present version of this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective 
April I, 1969), appears in GERR No. 288, at F·l (March 17, 1969).] 
58. L.A. Report 21-22. 
59. Id. at 23. 
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nullification on the basis of separate consultations between manage-
ment and some other organization representing part of the employees 
in the unit. 
Because of the peculiarities of public employment labor relations, 
determination of the appropriate unit for bargaining may well 
present greater difficulties in the public than in the private sector. 
For this reason, some of the reports recognized that the large amount 
of discretionary authority which the federal statute grants to the 
NLRB for bargaining unit determinations60 would not be appro-
priate in the public sector. These reports recommended that certain 
specific standards be incorporated into the governing state statutes in 
order to guide the administering agencies in determining appro-
priate bargaining units. The New York Report in particular stressed 
the necessity for a careful appraisal of what is termed "the frag-
mented vs. the over-all unit for negotiations."61 The Report stated: 
"Criteria for the definition of the term 'appropriate' are required 
which square with the characteristics of the public employment 
relationship and with the joint responsibility of the employees and 
administrators for the effective performance of their mission, namely, 
to serve the public."62 The Report enumerated a number of specific 
criteria upon which the determination of the appropriate bargaining 
unit should ultimately rest.63 In essence, the implementing New York 
legislation of 1967 incorporated these suggested standards.64 In ob-
serving the work of the state's Public Employment Relations Board, 
it will be particularly interesting to note whether it arrives at unit 
determinations substantially different from those which would be 
expected in the private sector. 
60. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964). 
61. N.Y. Report 10. 
62. Id. at 23. 
63. The New York Report suggests that the following factors should be taken into 
account in formulating criteria for defining an appropriate bargaining unit: 
(1) Consistency of the employee-employer unit with a community of interests 
among employees included in the unit. 
(a) Community of interests of employees with respect to conditions of em-
ployment applying particularly to them. 
(b) Community of interest of employees with respect to the continuation 
of a traditional, workable, and, on the whole, satisfactory negotiating pattern. 
(c) Community of interest of employees with respect to specialization of 
occupation according to their craft or profession. 
(d) Community of interest of employees with respect to the matter of 
exercising their right of representation. 
(2) Consistency of the terms of employment, the determination of which lies 
within the discretionary authority of the employing agency, with terms concern-
ing which negotiation is sought. 
(3) Compatability of the employee-employer unit with the joint duty of ad-
ministrators and employees to carry out their fundamental mission, i.e., service to 
public. 
N.Y. Report 23-28. 
64. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
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C. The Scope of Collective Bargaining 
The advisory reports generally recognize that the determination 
of appropriate subjects for collective bargaining in the public sector 
involves problems of the first magnitude. One critical problem is 
that public agencies, without some accommodating change in ap• 
plicable law, may lack the authority to make binding contractual 
commitments relating to certain subjects. For instance, limitations 
on discretionary authority are found in civil service legislation, 
municipal charter provisions, school codes, and other special legisla-
tion. A second question, more of policy than of law, is whether some 
subject matters should be entirely excluded from the scope of col• 
lective bargaining because of the special responsibility of public 
agencies to carry out public service functions.65 If there is to be a 
mandate for collective bargaining in the public sector, to what 
extent can or should the legislation take cognizance of these factors? 
Alternatively, should the state legislation merely include a broad 
duty to bargain, modeled on the NLRA, which would leave legal 
questions to be decided by the courts and policy questions to be 
decided by the processes of collective bargaining? 
The Michigan Act of 1965 followed the NLRA pattern by pre-
scribing a general obligation to bargain collectively on wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment. The Act also con-
tained a proviso similar to those in the NLRA guaranteeing the right 
of an individual employee to have his grievance adjusted at any 
time.66 
The Taylor Committee recognized that, as in the private sector, 
labor organizations in the public sector have broad bargaining aspira-
tions. However, it noted that "the expectations ... concerning what 
they can negotiate about are limited by the fact that certain terms of 
employment are mandated by legislative enactment."67 As an ex-
ample, the Committee referred to employees whose terms of employ-
ment are fixed by civil service legislation. The Committee ultimately 
concluded that, as a practical matter, the closest that political entities 
can come to traditional collective bargaining is "negotiation of terms 
on the assumption of the necessity for a joint commitment of the 
negotiating parties to the terms, but with the necessity to seek ap-
proval and the appropriations to implement any agreement from a 
legislative body."68 The Committee noted that there can be tradi-
65. Cf. Exec. Order 10,988. 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 compilation). 
66. Compare NLRA §§ 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) (1964), with MICH. · 
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.211 (1968). 
67. N.Y. Report 57. 
68. Id. at 58. 
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tional collective bargaining only "if the public through the action 
of its legislatures is ready to delegate to a bargaining 'team' composed 
of the executives of government agencies and the negotiators for 
employee organizations the virtual determination of its budget, the 
allocation of public revenues to alternative uses, and the setting of 
the tax rate necessary to balance that budget"-a "delegation scarcely 
likely to occur in the foreseeable future."69 
The New Jersey Commission tersely recommended "that the scope 
of negotiations should be limited by the discretionary or recom-
mending power of the appointing authority in public employ-
ment .... " 70 The reference to "recommending power," if written 
into law, could leave the range of negotiations very broad indeed. Of 
course, if the "discretionary power" of the employing authority is 
limited, the results of the bargaining process might not be conclusive. 
One possible solution to this problem is to specify that the results 
reached in collective bargaining shall prevail over any pre-existing 
statutory limitation on the authority of the employing agency. For 
example, the draft statute proposed by the Connecticut Commission 
included the following provision: 
Where there is a conflict between any agreement reached by a 
municipal employer and an employee organization and approved 
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and any charter, special 
act, ordinance, or rules and regulations adopted by the municipal 
employer or its agents . . . or any general statute regulating the 
hours of work of policemen or firemen, the terms of such agreement 
shall prevail.71 
The Connecticut body recognized only two qualifications to this 
principle:72 first, collective bargaining should not interfere with civil 
service control of merit-rating systems; second, every collective bar-
gaining agreement must be approved by the legislative body with 
authority over the employing agency. Under these qualifications, the 
legislative body would retain ultimate authority to reject demands 
which it considered inconsistent with sound fiscal or other policies. 
Despite these limitations, the Connecticut recommendations on the 
scope of bargaining represent a position strikingly different from the 
far more cautious approach taken by the Taylor Committee. 
Most of the advisory groups considered whether the legislature 
should pass an explicit statutory requirement wholly reserving cer-
tain managerial "prerogatives" as outside the scope of collective bar-
69. Id. 60-61. 
70. GERR No. 229, at D-7. 
71. GERR No. 81, at D-9. 
72. Id. 
906 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:891 
gaining. Following the pattern set by the Goldberg Task Force Re-
port73 at the federal level, most of the groups favored such provisions. 
Exceptions are found in the Connecticut and Michigan reports.74 
Public employers represented to the Michigan Advisory Committee 
that the 1965 Michigan Act should be amended in order to preserve 
certain managerial prerogatives.75 The Michigan Committee, while 
cognizant of the potentially serious problems underlying these sug-
gestions, did not consider them of such immediate importance as to 
warrant legislative changes without further study. 
The Taylor Committee did not deal as explicitly with this matter 
as did some of the groups, but its perceptive analysis of the problems, 
discussed under the caption "Character of Participating Activity,''76 
assumed that collective bargaining should not interfere with subject 
areas now delegated to various governmental authorities. The Report 
also noted that "the issue of 'retained rights' of the employer (related 
in public service to the proper performance of both the legislative 
and executive functions) is more difficult to deal with in the public 
sector than in the private sector."77 The Illinois Report stated: 
It should be the exclusive function of each public employing 
agency to determine the mission of the agency, set standards of ser-
vices to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion 
over its organization and operations. 
It should be the right of each public employing agency to direct 
its employees, take disciplinary action, relieve its employees from 
duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, and 
determine the methods, means, and personnel by which the agency's 
operations are to be conducted. But this should not preclude em-
ployees from negotiating or raising grievances about the practical 
consequences that decisions on these matters may have on wages, 
hours, and working conditions.78 
The Pennsylvania Report simply stated that collective bargaining 
should be "appropriately qualified by a recognition of existing laws 
dealing with aspects of the same subject matter and by a carefully 
defined reservation of managerial rights.''79 
The Los Angeles Report followed a more conservative ( or some 
would say, more sophisticated) view of the scope of public employee 
collective bargaining. It also presented perhaps the most complete 
73. See note 1 supra. 
74. Connecticut: GERR No. 81, at D-4 (by implication). Michigan: GERR No. 181, 
at F-12 (app. F). 
75. See GERR No. 181, at F-10 (app. D). 
76. N.Y. Report 58. 
77. Id. at 17. 
78. GERR No. 184, at D-7. 
79. GERR No. 281, at E-1 Gan. 27, 1969). 
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supporting rationale. Employee organizations, of course, had argued 
before the Committee that the "duty to bargain" should be stated in 
general terms such as those employed in the NLRA in order to leave 
the broadest scope for collective bargaining. County officials main-
tained that failure clearly to enumerate certain functions and duties 
as reserved to various agencies of county government would invite 
meaningless and unlawful attempts on the part of employee organi-
zations to widen the legally permissible scope of negotiation. The 
Committee stated its position as follows: 
On this issue we believe that attempts to draw an exact analogy 
with the private sector are misguided and dangerous. The extent to 
which private employers have agreed to share traditional managerial 
decisions with labor organizations has varied widely between in-
dustries and sometimes between enterprises in the same industry. 
Concessions on this subject are often merely pragmatic adjustments 
to special situations. In the event of bargaining impasses over this 
question, private employers and unions can usually resort to the 
economic weapons of lockout and strike. 
In the public sector, however, the situation is quite different. 
Managers of governmental agencies must insure that the functions 
intrusted to them are carried out promptly and without interrup-
tion. We think they should have the right initially to determine the 
manner in which these functions are to be performed. Accordingly, 
the provision we recommend explicitly sets forth those rights that 
County management may exercise unilaterally and ·without prior 
negotiation with employees or their organizations. 
At the same time, we recognize that actions taken by manage-
ment, purportedly "in the public interest," sometimes are unneces-
sary or arbitrary. We have therefore provided that nothing in the 
section on employer rights shall preclude employees from raising 
grievances about the practical consequences that decisions on mat-
ters reserved for management may have on wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment.80 
The Los Angeles Committee then distinguished between the "scope 
of consultation" and the scope of "negotiation": those matters explic-
itly made nonnegotiable by ordinance, but which affect employee 
relations, should be subject to "consultation" between employees and 
the employing agency. Thus under the proposed ordinance "every 
reasonable effort shall be made by management to consult with 
employees or their representatives prior to initiating basic changes 
in any rule or procedure affecting employee relations."81 Since the 
distinction benveen negotiation and consultation will "not always 
[be] clearly discernible," the Committee felt that it would be unwise 
"to try to draw [ such a line] once and for all and for all sub-
so. L.A. Report 8-9. 
81. Id. at 10. 
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jects .... "82 Rather, the Committee suggested that "in close and 
doubtful cases the [proposed] enforcement commission be empowered 
to draw the line on an ad hoc basis."83 It will be interesting to follow 
the experience in Los Angeles County to see whether the somewhat 
ambiguous distinction between negotiation and consultation pro-
duces results markedly different than those that would be expected 
under the NLRA's general definition of the scope of collective bar-
gaining. 
Some proposals for an explicit reservation of managerial prerog-
atives in public employers would constitute, if adopted, a mandate 
that collective bargaining agreements in the public sector should 
include something approaching-perhaps even more comprehensive 
than-the "management rights" provisions frequently negotiated 
into private sector contracts. I have some doubt about the feasibility, 
or even the desirability, of this kind of attempted restriction on the 
scope of public employee collective bargaining. Private sector unions 
generally do not quarrel with the position that the ability of a private 
firm to determine such matters as the kind and quality of its products 
or services is and should remain a managerial prerogative. However, 
there are some categories of employees in the public sector who, by 
virtue of the nature of their occupations and professional interests, 
might claim to have a negotiable concern with the "mission" or goals 
of particular public agencies. For example, public school teachers 
may reasonably assert that they have a legitimate interest not only 
in compensation and "conditions" of employment, but also in the 
fundamental educational policies to be followed in a school system.84 
Perhaps the same could be said of police and fire fighters. Obviously, 
a public agency cannot abdicate all of its public responsibility to 
teachers, policemen, or fire fighters, but an obligation to negotiate-
to share in decision-making-does not necessarily involve abdication. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the quality of many public services 
would be substantially improved if those most directly involved in, 
and dedicated to, the "mission" of the agency had a more direct hand 
in the policy-making process. 
D. The Strike Issue 
I. The Right To Strike 
The question whether public employees should be permitted the 
right to strike has received unusual emphasis in the various state 
82. Id. at 11. 
83. Id. at 12. 
84. See Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in Public 
Education: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 
1042-46 (1969); Wallett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1017, 1019-21 (1969). 
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advisory group reports, not only because of the difficult underlying 
policy issues involved, but also because the public seems to be more 
genuinely concerned about this matter than with most other issues 
raised by public employee unionism. With the single exception of 
the Pennsylvania Report, the advisory groups subscribed to the tra-
ditional position that employees in the public sector should not be 
permitted to strike. Still, as I read the reports, they exhibit varying 
levels of philosophic commitment to this policy. 
The Taylor Committee left little doubt concerning the extent 
of its commitment to the no-strike position. According to its Report, 
strikes "in the field of government service" should continue to be 
illegal regardless of how essential the particular services involved are 
to the community.85 The argument did not rest on the traditional 
theory that public employee strikes constitute an impermissible 
interference with the "sovereignty" of the state. 86 Instead, the Com-
mittee emphasized certain differences between the functions, con-
straints, and freedoms applicable to employers in the public and 
private sectors. Because of the distinction between "the constraints of 
the market place on collective bargaining" in private employment 
and "the constraints imposed by democratic political processes" in 
public employment, "the strike cannot be a part of the negotiating 
process" in the public sector.87 The Illinois Commission also took the 
position that work stoppages are not appropriate in the public sector 
and should be unequivocally prohibited.88 
The Connecticut, Michigan, and New Jersey committees, al-
though advocating continuance of a no-strike policy, intimated less 
conviction about the validity of this approach. Although the Con-
necticut Commission stated that "the right to strike is an essential 
element in any viable system of free collective bargaining," it deferred 
to the existing consensus opposed to the right to strike for public 
employees.80 The Michigan Committee stated that it did not regard 
the "ultimate issue" as settled, 00 and the New Jersey Commission 
recognized "that both public sentiment and judicial opinion may 
alter over time."91 
The Los Angeles Committee, although stating that "public em-
ployee strikes are and should be unlawful,"92 elected for undisclosed 
85. N.Y. Report 42. 
86. For discussions of the doctrine of "sovereignty" in relation to public employee 
collective action, see ·w. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 
(1961); C. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW (1946). 
87. N.Y. Report 16. 
88. GERR No. 184, at D-11. 
89. GERR No. 81, at D-5. 
90. GERR No. 181, at F-2. 
91. GERR No. 229, at D-6. 
92, L.A. Report !II. 
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reasons not to justify its position. Thus, according to this advisory 
group, to say that strikes are unacceptable "is merely to add a di-
mension to the problem and does not contribute to its solution."03 
The Los Angeles panel, like most of the others, emphasized the ne-
cessity of producing collective bargaining attitudes and dispute set-
tlement procedures (short of compulsory arbitration) that "the parties 
will be willing to substitute for trial by economic combat."94 But the 
Committee did not claim that its recommendations directed toward 
this objective offered a "fool proof panacea";95 indeed, none of the 
advisory groups made such a claim. 
The Pennsylvania Commission was alone among the advisory 
groups in taking the position that "except for policemen and firemen, 
a limited right to strike should be recognized," subject to certain 
basic safeguards designed to protect the public interest and condi-
tioned upon exhaustion of other procedures.96 The argument for this 
startling deviation from the traditional view merits careful examina-
tion. The Commission's Report states, in part: 
No one should have a right to strike until all collective bargain-
ing procedures have been exhausted .... 
Likewise there can be no right of public employees to strike if 
the health, safety or welfare of the public is endangered. . . . 
But where collective bargaining procedures have been exhausted 
and public health, safety or welfare is not endangered it is inequita-
ble and unwise to prohibit strikes. The period that a strike can be 
permitted will vary from situation to situation. A strike of gardeners 
in a public park could be tolerated longer than a strike of garbage 
collectors. And a garbage strike might be permissible for a few days 
but not indefinitely, and for longer in one community than another, 
or in one season than another. 
The collective bargaining process will be strengthened if this 
qualified right to strike is recognized. It will be some curb on the 
possible intransigence of an employer; and the limitations on the 
right to strike will serve notice on the employee that there are limits 
to the hardships that he can impose.97 
2. Sanctions for Violations of the No-Strike Policy 
Those advisory groups which recommended adherence to the no-
strike policy have taken somewhat different positions on what sanc-
tions should be employed to implement that policy. There was 
substantial accord that punitive sanctions directed at individual 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. GERR No. 251, at E-1 (July I, 1968). 
97. Id. at E-2 to E-3. 
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employees, such as those embodied in New York's now-defunct Con-
don-Wadlin Law98 or Michigan's former Hutchinson Act,99 are 
unworkable in any major strike situation. However, the New York, 
Michigan, and Illinois groups did agree that one possible sanction 
is a "self-help" approach under which the employing agency could 
initiate disciplinary action or discharge proceedings against employ-
ees who break the law.100 
A number of reports specifically recommended use of the injunc-
tion as a remedial alternative. Here, however, some rather significant 
differences in approach become apparent. The Taylor Committee 
took the position that in every strike or threatened strike situation, 
an injunction should be sought and granted. Indeed, the Committee 
proposed that the law officer of the employing agency involved in the 
dispute should be empowered automatically to seek an injunction 
against illegal strikes and, if the resulting court decree were violated, 
"to institute a criminal contempt proceeding. promptly."101 The New 
York Committee also maintained that a public agency which had 
sought and obtained injunctive relief should be dissuaded from "ne-
gotiating away," through the processes of collective bargaining, either 
the injunction itself or the striking organization's potential liability 
for contempt.102 It is implicit in the recommendations of the Taylor 
Committee that an equity court should not be limited in the fine or 
other penalty which it can assess against an organization or individual 
found to be in contempt of an injunction. The Committee proposed 
the elimination of the 250-dollars-per-day ceiling on fines which had 
been prescribed in section 751 of the New York Judiciary Law.103 
However, the legislature did not follow this suggestion; in the Taylor 
Law in 1967 it revised the Judiciary Law to prescribe a maximum 
fine for individuals of 250 dollars per day and a maximum fine for 
employee organizations of the lesser of a week's membership dues or 
10,000 dollars per day. Obviously, any such provision, placing an 
upper limit on the penalties which can be imposed for contempt of 
court, makes it difficult to test fully the theory that the injunctive 
remedy can be a means of dealing effectively with strike situations.104 
98. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of April 
23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). 
99. Law of Oct. 11, 1947, ch. 423, § 208, [1947] Mich. Pub. Acts 336 (for inciting to 
strike, imprisonment for not more than one year, fine from $100 to $1,000). 
100. N.Y. Report 43-44; GERR No. 181, at F-4 (Michigan); GERR No. 184, at D-12 
(Illinois). 
101. N.Y. Report 43. 
102. Id. 
103. See N.Y. Report 43. 
104. Contrast the fines imposed in United States v. United Mine Workers of 
America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). The district judge had levied fines of $3,500,000 and 
$10,000 against the United Mine Workers Union and John L. Lewis, respectively, for 
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Indeed, in recent months the Taylor Committee has again recom-
mended that the limitations on penalties contained in section 751 
of the Judiciary Law be removed. In response to this proposal, the 
New York legislature amended the Taylor Law on March 4, 1969, 
to provide for unlimited fines against striking unions.105 
The Michigan Committee's approach was somewhat different. 
The Michigan Act of 1965, although it prohibited strikes by public 
employees, specifically recognized only one remedial sanction: dis-
ciplinary action or discharge by the public employer.106 The Com-
mittee recommended that the legislature amend the statute to make 
it clear that the judiciary has authority to enjoin strikes-an issue in 
dispute at the time of the Report but since resolved by the courts 
themselves.107 The Committee further recommended that while in-
junctive relief should be mandatory for any strike threatened or 
occurring before the exhaustion of recommended dispute settlement 
procedures,108 the issua~ce of an injunction thereafter should be dis-
cretionary with the court. In deciding whether to issue an injunction, 
the court would be expressly authorized to consider all the relevant 
facts, including a charge that the employing agency had failed to dis-
charge its statutory obligation to bargain in good faith.109 It is implicit 
violation of a restraining order. The Supreme Court sustained the fine against Lewis 
and $700,000 of the fine against the Union as appropriate penalties for criminal con-
tempt of the lower court's order. The balance of the fine against the Union was 
abated subject to union action to purge itself of contempt. I do not suggest that fines 
of this magnitude, or that an unlimited discretion in the matter of fines, should 
necessarily be used. Moreover, I am fully cognizant of the fact that even a large fine 
can have a minimal adverse impact on a large union if, as is probable, the union 
possesses the power to levy a special assessment on its members to cover the fine. 
105. The amended Taylor Law also provides for the loss of dues check-off privileges 
for unlimited periods and the loss of two day's pay for each day an employee is on 
strike. Moreover, a striking worker is subject to one year's probation with loss of tenure 
for any violation of the strike prohibition. GERR No. 288, at F-6 to F-7. 
106. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.206 (1967). 
107. In School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968), 
the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that Michigan courts have the jurisdiction to 
restrain strikes by public employees. 
108. I recognize that there may be a legal question whether or not a state legisla-
ture may constitutionally compel an equity court to issue an injunction, without 
regard to any question other than the existence or nonexistence of a strike, without 
inquiry into the "equities" of the case. 
109. The effect of this recommendation is ~·~ recognize the equitable "clean bands" 
doctrine in cases of strikes by public employees. The decision of the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Holland (see note 107 supra) appears to be consistent with this recommenda-
tion. In the Holland case, the Court dissolved the temporary injunction granted in a 
teachers' strike and remanded the case, with the suggestion that the lower court inquire 
into whether the plaintiff School District bad refused to bargain in good faith. !180 
Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211. The American Bar Association's Section on Labor 
Relations Law construed this recommendation of the Michigan co1. mittce to mean 
that strikes should be permitted "under limited circumstances." Report of the Com-
mittee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, presented at the 1967 Annual 
Meeting of the American Bar Association and reprinted in the Labor Relations Law 
Section program for that meeting. 
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in the Michigan Report that an equity court should not be limited in 
its discretionary power to impose fines or other penalties for vio-
lations of in junctions. 
The Illinois Commission, like the Taylor Committee, took the 
view that an in junction should be sought in all cases of illegal strikes. 
Unlike the Taylor Committee, however, the Illinois Commission 
would vest responsibility for initiating court action in the employing 
agency itself rather than in its principal legal officer.11° As a result, 
the legal officer could not seek an injunction automatically until au-
thorized to do so by his superiors. The Illinois Commission, also 
unlike the Taylor Committee, did not indicate what penalties a court 
should apply in a contempt proceeding against employees or a labor 
organization for violating an injunction. The panel simply stated 
that the statute should "affirm the existing power of the courts 
to enjoin strikes and should make clear that its provisions are not de-
signed to limit any inherent judicial power."111 This recommendation 
seems to recognize that injunctive relief-traditionally an extra-
ordinary legal remedy granted only after judicial balancing of the 
conflicting interests of the parties-should not be granted simply on 
a showing by the employing agency that a strike is imminent or has 
occurred.112 The recommendation also recognizes that an equity court 
should retain its traditional discretion in the matter of fines. 
The Pennsylvania Commission, while proposing that strikes be 
legalized under strict safeguards designed to protect the public in-
terest, also recommended that "severe penalties" should be imposed 
for violation of an injunction against a strike declared illegal by judi-
cial decree. These penalties, declared the Commission, should "take 
the form of fines or imprisonment or both against strikers or the 
organizations responsible for strikes."113 
The Connecticut, New Jersey, and Los Angeles advisory groups 
elected to deal with the strike issue only in terms of principle, without 
prescribing specific sanctions. The Connecticut Report's proposed 
statutory provision merely stated: "Nothing in this Act shall consti-
tute a grant of the right to strike to employees of any municipal em-
ployer and such strikes are hereby expressly prohibited."114 The 
proposed Los Angeles County ordinance, as noted above, did not 
U0. GERR No. 184, at D-12. 
111. Id. 
112. Cf. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 280 Mich. 314, 325-27, 157 N.W.2d 
206, 210 (1968). 
113. GERR No. 251, at E-3. 
114. GERR No. 81, at D-10. 
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contain any provision dealing with strikes. The Los Angeles Com-
mittee expressed its judgment regarding sanctions as follows: 
In our judgment it is far preferable to specify no penalties in the 
ordinance, thereby preserving for the Commission or County, as the 
case may be, complete freedom to act in whatever way deemed nec-
essary to deal with a particular situation. Thus, it could take various 
administrative actions against the offending organization and em-
ployees, such as cancellation of checkoff or dismissal, or seek an ap-
propriate remedy in the courts, such as an injunction. Uncertainty as 
to what the County might do under these circumstances would in 
itself constitute a possible deterrent against strikes and stoppages.110 
The Committee emphasized, however, that it was not recommending 
the imposition of increasingly severe sanctions as a solution to the 
problem of public employee strikes.116 
A possible sanction against illegal strike action, applied at the 
federal level under Executive Order 10,988,117 is the denial of recog-
nition to a public sector union or other employee organization which 
asserts the right to strike or engages in strike action. The Taylor 
Committee recommended this as an additional sanction which could 
be imposed in the discretion of the proposed Public Employment 
Relations Board. Such discretion would enable the Board to weigh 
"the equities" of a given situation, including the merits of any charge 
that the employing agency engaged in such "acts of extreme provo-
cation as to detract from the fault of the employee organization or 
its officers in permitting the strike to take place."118 However, the 
New York legislature in its 1967 enactment rejected this recommen-
dation of the Taylor Committee: it authorized the cancellation of the 
"check-off" for a period not to exceed eighteen months, but did not 
authorize cancellation of recognition rights.119 Withdrawal of recog-
nition was considered, but rejected, by the Illinois and Michigan 
committees, and, implicitly, by the Connecticut, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania advisory groups. It is not altogether clear whether the 
Los Angeles Committee included cancellation of recognition among 
the kinds of "administrative actions" which an employing agency 
could take against a striking organization. 
ll5. L.A. Report 33-34. 
ll6. Id. at 34. 
117. 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 compilation). 
118. N.Y. Report 44. 
119. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(£) (McKinney Supp. 1968). The amendment of March 
4, 1969, however, provides for the loss of dues check-off privileges for unlimited periods. 
GERR No. 288, at F-7. 
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3. The Definition of a Strike 
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One additional problem with "the strike issue" is definitional: 
Should a general strike prohibition be construed to include a variety 
of concerted actions which, although something less than a formal 
strike, are undertaken to advance collective bargaining aims? Such 
concerted actions might include mass resignations, calling in sick 
(sometimes referred to as "blue flu" in police situations), on-the-job 
"slowdowns," and, in the case of public school teachers, concerted 
refusals to sign individual contracts. The Connecticut Report and 
proposed draft statute made no effort to define a "strike." The New 
York, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Los An-
geles groups did not deal with the problem explicitly. The advisory 
body in Illinois, going further, recommended that "the definition 
of a strike should be broad enough to include such concerted stop-
pages as mass resignations and the mass calling-in-sick, designed to 
place pressure on the governmental agency."120 Apart from what the 
committees have said, the courts will probably have little difficulty 
interpreting general legislation prohibiting public employee strikes 
to include these other forms of concerted action short of total work 
stoppage. The more difficult question is whether the sanctions im-
posed by courts or other tribunals can effectively control this kind of 
economic pressure.121 
E. Procedures for the Settlement of Contract Disputes 
All the reports stressed the necessity of evolving dispute settle-
ment procedures which would reduce the need to resort to strike 
action. The Taylor Committee emphasized that public employer 
agencies and employee organizations must give serious attention to 
developing improved bargaining skills and bargaining patterns re-
sponsive to budgetary timetables and other constraints in order to 
cope with the unique problems of collective bargaining in the public 
120. GERR No. 184, at D-12. 
121. Obviously, the courts will face practical difficulties-including problems of 
proof-in attempting to supervise employee conduct in the case of alleged "slow-downs," 
sick-call-ins, and mass resignations. A difficult legal question is whether this type of 
employee action, though done concertedly for the purpose of forcing an improvement 
in working conditions, can lawfully be enjoined in view of the constitutional right of 
an individual to terminate his employment. It would seem that any court decree 
would have to recognize the right of an individual, disassociated from any group 
decision, to quit his employment. The situation of the school teacher, who may be 
required by state law to sign an individual employment contract, also presents its 
unique legal and practical problems. For example, may a court appropriately order a 
teacher to sign an individual employment contract before collective bargaining negoti-
ations between the teachers' association and the school board have been completed 
and an agreement reached? 
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sector.122 This suggestion was based on the premise that skillful, good-
faith, realistic negotiations will be more likely to produce settlements 
than the crude and untutored forms of collective bargaining which 
have all too often characterized the initial stages of collective bargain-
ing in the public sector. 
The advisory reports differed somewhat in their specific recom-
mendations concerning the design and implementation of appro-
priate dispute resolution procedures. For instance, there was no 
agreement on how fact-finding should be carried out. Should desig-
nated fact :finders simply conduct appropriate hearings and make 
:findings of fact, or should they also be empowered to conduct 
mediation? There have been various suggestions concerning the 
extent to which fact-finding recommendations should be publicized 
and public attention focused on the party deemed to be at fault on 
particular bargaining issues. The Michigan Committee recom-
mended that the parties to a dispute be required to resort to specific 
statutory procedures-negotiation, mediation, and fact-finding-
according to a definite timetable necessitated by the budgetary and 
other constraints upon the particular public agency.123 These are 
areas in which there is room for differences of opinion and further 
experimentation. Experience with a variety of procedures should 
provide a better empirical basis for judgments concerning their 
efficacy. 
One impasse resolution alternative which may attract increasing 
support in coming years is the use of compulsory third-party arbitra-
tion of disputes over contract terms. The advisory groups, with the 
exception of the Rhode Island and Michigan committees, rejected 
this approach. The Michigan Committee suggested that compulsory 
arbitration be tried, experimentally, for a limited period in the 
case of policemen and fire :fighters.124 Implementation of this ap-
proach on a wider basis would be difficult without substantial public 
support as well as the support of the employing agencies and the 
employee organizations directly concerned, and the latter may not 
be quickly forthcoming. Moreover, the use of compulsory arbitration 
raises some fundamental problems of governmental structure: it 
entails a delegation of authority to third parties to make decisions 
which the public has traditionally entrusted to its elected or ap-
pointed representatives. It may be that some of these problems can 
be ameliorated by the enactment of specific guidelines or standards 
for decision which will operate as constraints upon third-party de-
122. N.Y. Report 33. 
123. GERR No. 181, at F-2 to F-3. 
124. Id. at F-3. 
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terminations. The dimensions of the problems are considerable, 
however, and cannot be treated adequately here. 
The fundamental problem in public sector labor relations, as we 
have seen, is the assumed inconsistency between the grant of a right 
to bargain collectively and the attempt to prohibit strike action as a 
means of supporting bargaining demands. The increasing incidence 
of public employee strikes despite their illegality suggests that the 
dilemma may be beyond resolution. If this is in fact the case, the 
preferable course-suggested by the Pennsylvania Committee125 and 
a few other observers-may be to affirm the right of public employees 
to strike subject to conditions designed to safeguard the public 
interest. After all, it appears that the adamant refusal in this country 
to permit strikes in the public sector is a phenomenon by no means 
universally shared in other countries. In this regard, the experience 
of foreign nations with other points of view on the strike issue might 
profitably be explored.126 At the same time, there is some evidence in 
this country that alternative dispute resolution procedures, includ-
ing mediation and fact-finding, have been sufficient to induce settle-
ments in most situations.127 It may be that these procedures, coupled 
with the development of improved bargaining skills and an increased 
recognition by the parties that the public will not tolerate prolonged 
strikes with an adverse effect upon essential services, will enable 
most collective bargaining issues to be resolved in the negotiating 
process short of disruptive strikes. Still, I very much doubt that 
public sector strikes will wholly disappear. My guess is that their 
incidence will rise as the areas of organization and collective bar-
gaining in the public sector expand. If this prognostication is accu-
rate, there will be further support for the thesis that strikes cannot 
really be prevented. Unless we accord public employees at least a 
limited right to strike, we will be in danger-and perhaps already are 
-of according a kind of de facto recognition to conduct officially 
declared illegal. This state of affairs is scarcely desirable in any 
society which purports to order its human relations according to the 
processes of law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Obviously, this survey of the reports and recommendations of 
public employment advisory groups has not purported to take ac-
125. Pennsylvania Report 5, 12-14. 
126. See generally Schmidt, General Report (II B) to the Sixth Intl. Cong. of Labour 
Law and Social Legislation, Stockholm, Aug. 15-17, 1966. 
127. See J. BELASCO, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1966); Stern, Wisconsin 
Fact-Finding Procedure, 20 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. REv. 1 (1966); Howlett, Michigan's 
Experience with Public Employee Bargaining, in GERR, No. 206, at E-1 (Aug. 21, 
1967). 
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count of numerous unofficial contributions independently made by 
various persons interested in public sector unionism-academicians, 
government personnel, labor leaders, journalists, and others.128 This 
Symposium, indeed, contains a number of such contributions. A 
comparison of their views with those of the officially constituted 
advisory groups will reveal that the advisory group reports are not a 
repository of all there is to be said about public sector unionism. 
The peculiar virtue of advisory group efforts lies in the oppor-
tunity presented for responsible, consultative deliberation. Indeed, 
I would reaffirm the merit of the recommendation contained in sev-
eral of the reports that state public employment relations legislation 
should establish in each state a permanent advisory commission. 
These bodies should have the responsibility to examine and report to 
the governor and the legislature developments in public employment 
labor relations; they would thus ensure continuous objective ap-
praisal of existing policy in the field with a view toward possible 
modifications. Pressures on legislative bodies by "management," 
"labor," and other interested groups to adopt some particular policy 
in the area of public sector unionism will inevitably increase. As this 
occurs, the need for help in determining the appropriate policy will 
increase correspondingly because the problems are difficult, the issues 
are serious, and the public interest is deeply involved. 
128. See generally M. MosKow, TEACHERS AND UNIONS (1966); Morris, Public Policy 
and the Law Relating to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 22 Sw. L.J. 585 
(1968); Newland, Collective Bargaining Concepts: Application in Governments, 28 PUB. 
ADM. R.Ev. 141 (1968); McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee Labor 
Relations, 20 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 179 (1967); Stieber, Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Sector, in THE AMERICAN AssEMBLY, CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
ch. 3 (1967). 
